Congress enacted as part of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"). 5 Chief Judge Wilkinson's opinion is remarkable because he not only discerns candidly the current era of judicial activism-he embraces it. " [T] he present jurisprudence," he writes, "holds the promise to be an enduring and constructive one .... ,,6 Pragmatist that he is, ChiefJudge Wilkinson cautions that the potential of the current era will be lost unless the courts "temper" their role in second-guessing federal legislation "by the maxims of prudence and restraint."
'7 "If modern activism accelerates to a gallop," ChiefJudge Wilkinson warns, "then this era will go the way of its discredited forebear," '8 namely, the widely deplored heyday of economic substantive due process following Lochner v. New York. 9 Chief Judge Wilkinson's cautionary notes aside, it is worth beholding his opinion as among the very few ever written in which the author actually welcomes the title, 'Judicial Activist."
Chief Judge Wilkinson's opinion has done American constitutionalism a favor. For a conservative judge to admit that judicial activism can make an enduring and constructive contribution to our constitutional jurisprudence may significantly change the framework within which judicial activism and restraint are usually debated. His perspective should promote a genuine and thorough reevaluation of that debate. And, on this most general of levels, I endorse ChiefJudge Wilkinson's acknowledgment that at least some versions of judicial activism can, in principle, be constructive.
ChiefJudge Wilkinson is unjustified, however, in his optimism for the current conservative project of devising new doctrinal tools for cutting back Congress' commercial regulatory powers in order to protect the states' sovereign rights. These doctrinal tools, I believe, are overwhelmingly likely to prove unworkable. They are likely to be employed in the invalidation of national legislation that, in terms of the values of federalism, will be indistinguishable from other legislation that even current conservative judicial activists concede to be plainly constitutional. They are not justified by the current circumstances of our federal system. And, be-5. Pub cause they are likely to be employed by judges less willing than Chief Judge Wilkinson to acknowledge their activist role forthrightly, these doctrinal maneuvers will often be dressed up in discussions of history or precedent that will be wrongheaded and misleading. All of this is well illustrated by the Fourth Circuit opinion to which Chief Judge Wilkinson concurs, an opinion whose rhetoric is a kind of negative model of how judges should not write important opinions.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW COMMERCE CLAUSE ACTIVISM:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW Delineating the respective spheres of national and state regulatory authority has been one of the Supreme Court's most enduring preoccupations. Two of Chief Justice John Marshall's three foundational opinions,
McCulloch v. Maryland'° and Gibbons v. Ogden,
1 focused on just this problem. 12 To a significant degree, the Court's ensuing federalism jurisprudence can be regarded as the collective attempt of later generations to wrestle with the very same issues that Marshall so famously confronted.
Between 1937 and 1964, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that, in brief, came to embody an "800-pound gorilla" theory of Congress' authority to legislate regarding "commerce . . . among the several
States." 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. This remained the conventional answer among law students for some time to come. See Deborah Jones Merritt, COMMERCE!, 94 MicH. L. REv Hints of a different direction clearly emerged, however, with the ascension to the Court of then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist in 1972. justice Rehnquist was hardly the first modern Justice to show sensitivity to federalism issues, either in interpreting constitutional restrictions on state political authority or in evaluating the centralizing impact of national legislation. He revealed, however, an early penchant for crafting ambitious judicial opinions that creatively limited the reach of federal lawmaking with regard to the states. Perhaps most notable in his first two terms were opinions narrowing the concept of state action reachable by the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 expanding the immunity of state officers for liability under the Eleventh Amendment 2 ' and limiting the implications of the Court's reapportionment decisions. 22 Justice Rehnquist's most important opinion of the mid-1970s in terms of constraining the authority of the national government vis-a-vis the states was, of course, National League of Cities v. Usery. 23 In National League of Cities, the Court, by invalidating the application of federal minimum wage/maximum hour laws to state employees, turned its back on a chain of precedent holding that state sovereignty per se was not a limitation on otherwise permissible exercises of Congress' commerce powers. 24 Writing for a five-justice majority, including a hesitant justice Blackmun, justice Rehnquist announced that states could henceforth not be subjected even to Commerce Clause legislation that would be valid if applied to private parties, if such legislation: (1) purported to regulate the "States qua States"; (2) would "displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions"; and (3) was not justified by an exceptionally strong federal interest that overbalanced the States' interest in autonomy. 25 Justice Rehnquist's opinion was elusive on the source of this principle; although he mentioned the Tenth Amendment, he hardly discussed it. 26 He seemed instead to rest on a background understanding of state sovereignty from late Eighteenth Century political thought, a version of state sovereignty that could not be impaired by federal legislation. 27 Unfortunately for his thesis, the late Eighteenth Century political thought most consistent with Rehnquist's view of state sovereignty belonged to the Anti-Federalists, for whom the Constitution was a significant political defeat precisely because it did not embody their political philosophy. 28 Whatever its jurisprudential merits, National League of Cities ultimately generated more law review commentary than immunity from federal regulation. Four cases exploring the scope of National League of Cities reached the Supreme Court between 1976 and 1982, and, in each of them, the Court upheld Congress' regulatory powers. 29 In 1985, Justice Blackmun abandoned his allegiance to National League of Cities when he authored Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 30 That decision overturned National League of Cities on the ground that Justice Rehnquist's articulated test had proved unworkable in practice, 3 1 inconsistent with a proper understanding of federalism principles 32 32. See id. at 545-47 (explaining how "problem is that neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other that purports to separate out important governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society").
actual protection of state decision making authority. 33 In a dissent that could be read as a not-so-veiled reference to Justice Blackmun's advanced age, Justice Rehnquist wrote, "I do not think it incumbent.., to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court."
34
By this time, however, the cause of federalism had picked up an important new ally on the Court. In 1981,Justice Stewart, himself a considerable defender of state autonomy, was succeeded by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. O'Connor brought to the job not only a strong interpretive predisposition to respect the states' political authority, but also a sophisticated intellectual perspective on the value and practice of federalism. Her dissent in Garcia is more compelling than the Rehnquist opinion in National League of Cities precisely because it at least hints at the creativity necessarily entailed in the judicial task she advocates. 35 Unlike Justice Rehnquist, she does not write exclusively as if the Constitution itself expresses a doctrinal test of state immunity from regulation that the Court can uncover archaeologically. She explicitly acknowledges that modern economic conditions have created a world different from late Eighteenth Century America, implying that the Court must construct ways of giving enforceable content to the Tenth Amendment in order to protect any possibility for a meaningful diffusion of power between national and state governments.
36
If ever there were an example of losing a judicial battle but winning the war, or at least a larger battle, Garcia is it. Since Garcia, the Court has launched into a three-pronged attack on congressional regulatory power that goes well beyond the scope of National League of Cities and suggests at least a potential return to what I would call the "Old Deal" with regard to the Court's treatment of federalism. 40 The first prong of this attack has been the erection of a categorical "anti-commandeering principle" that precludes Congress from compelling state legislatures or state executive functionaries from enforcing federal law. In one case, the Court rebuffed Congress for its attempt to force states either to regulate nuclear waste disposal consistent with federal statutory requirements or to take ownership of all such waste within the state itself.
4 1 In another, the Court overturned legislation requiring local police to cooperate in determining whether proposed firearms sales would be lawful until such time as the federal government could complete the implementation of a computerized National Instant Check System to facilitate immediate determinations on the eligibility of would-be gun owners Both these attacks on federal regulatory power are farther reaching than National League of Cities. National League of Cities would limit Congress' Commerce Clause authority only if its exercise would "displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions" and would do so without an overbalancing federal interest. 44 In contrast, under the anti-commandeering principle and recent Eleventh Amendment cases, state autonomy is protected even where the federal mandate has no bearing on traditional governmental functions, and even when it would have no impact on the capacity of states to structure or finance their integral operations.
It is the third prong, however, that harks back to the Old Deal of federalism most emphatically. In United States v. Lopez, 45 the Court resurrected the notion that there is a discrete category of activity that, even if it affects interstate commerce, may not be regulated pursuant to Congress' commerce power unless a court independently determines that the effects on commerce are substantial enough to justify national legislation. The Court voided the originally enacted version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 46 which had made it a federal crime knowingly to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school.
47
The Lopez decision merits discussion, especially in light of its progeny. 48 But three preliminary points about the Supreme Court's new activism for states' rights bear noting in brief beforehand. First, the federalism cases of the 1990s can hardly be defended as straightforward interpretations of the constitutional text. Second, like National League of Cities, they are based on historical interpretation that is dubious at best. Third, their public policy consequences-especially with regard to the Eleventh Amendment cases-are truly regrettable.
Consider the textual point: the Eleventh Amendment expressly prohibits only suits against states in federal court prosecuted "by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." 49 Were we to rely on plain text, the obvious implication would be that states may be sued in federal court by their own citizens and that the Constitution does not guarantee sovereign immunity in state court at all. With regard to the regulation of activities affecting commerce, Congress enjoys express authority " [ With regard to history, as I have already mentioned, National League of Cities suffers the conspicuous defect of interpreting the Constitution as if it embodied chiefly the political intentions of its opponents. The anti-commandeering and Eleventh Amendment cases suffer the equally apparent problem of relying on historical analyses of inapposite issues. For example, the anti-commandeering cases seek to establish an historical foundation for the proposition that the national government was to have the power to regulate American citizens directly, rather than through the states. Proving this, however, is very different from establishing that Congress was precluded from regulating American citizens indirectly and through state governmental apparatus when it should choose to do so. With regard to the "commandeering" of state administrative authority, the evidence that does exist is chiefly in support of Congress' discretion to rely on such authority when it deems it appropriate. The Eleventh Amendment cases try to get around the obvious textual difficulties by arguing that the amendment was not intended to embody all of the state sovereign immunity from suit that the Framers recognized. Rather, the Court has argued, there was a background understanding that states would retain immunity from suit following the ratification of the Constitution; the Eleventh Amendment merely made express the one aspect of that immunity that it was necessary to reiterate because the Marshall Court had erroneously breached that immunity. Even if there were something to this general point, it again would be answering the wrong question. We can assume, that is, that the founding generation expected that states would retain after ratification the sovereign immunity that they had enjoyed at common law. The actual issue warranting exploration, however, is whether the founding generation would have thought it unconstitutional to overcome that immunity through federal legislation.
5 4 On that point, the available evidence again suggests that the Court's reading of congressional authority is unjustifiably narrow.
5
At least as troubling as these textual and historical points is that the anti-commandeering and Eleventh Amendment cases create perverse public policy outcomes. A direct implication of the anti-commandeering cases, especially with regard to the bar against conscripting state administrative authority, is that Congress should consider enlarging our national law enforcement apparatus whenever it expands the substantive reach of our national regulatory law.
5 6 This would seem, on its face, to increase the threat to individual liberty stemming from national law enforcement machinery. It would also seem to multiply considerably the potential sources of tension between state and national authorities engaged in law enforcement. It is worth noting that other countries, such as Germany, which is also a federal republic, protect the values of federalism precisely by insisting that only state authorities be charged with the implementation of na- 56. The alternative would be to offer funding to the states in return for their voluntary implementation of federal legislation. The breadth with which the Supreme Court has approved such "bargains" casts some doubt on the practical significance of the anti-commandeering and Eleventh Amendment cases. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding conditioning of federal highway funding on state decisions to raise minimum drinking age to 21). Congress, for example, could condition federal funding for state police authorities on their participation in identification checks for would-be gun purchasers, or make federal funds for state universities dependent on waivers of sovereign immunity in lawsuits charging patent violations by those universities.
57. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that some countries implement federal law through constituent states). Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion states:
The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union .. .all provide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central "federal" body. They do so in part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the independent authority of the "state," member nation, or other subsidiary government, and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.
Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 45: p. 201 American states would prefer to shoulder some of the burdens of national law enforcement if that responsibility also entailed the prospect of coordinating federal law enforcement activity with state priorities and reducing interagency friction.
The normative consequences of the Eleventh Amendment cases are even more obviously troubling. One is hard pressed to identify any public policy reason why we would prefer a constitutional regime in which the national government is permitted to impose legal obligations on the states, but in which the states are constitutionally entitled to violate those obligations with relative impunity. 62 insulates state universities from private suits based on unlawful age discrimination. Far from advancing two of the values most often associated with federalism-protecting citizens from the over-concentration of power and promoting the accountability of political authority-these decisions denigrate them. Enlarging the prospects for oppressive state government hardly seems a project worthy of judicial solicitude.
III. LoPEz AND ITS PROGENY AS BAD LAw
Of the three prongs of the Supreme Court's recent activism on behalf of the states, the one that is potentially most radical is the crafting of judicially imposed constraints on the commerce power itself, as embodied in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the five-member majority in Lopez overturned the Gun-Free School Zones Act, but did not offer any precise formulation of the constitutional limit Congress transgressed in enacting that legislation.
65 This is not surprising. As Justice Breyer's dissent amply shows, even the original Gun-Free School Zones Act would seem to have been self-evidently valid under the usual pre-Lopez doctrinal formulation of Congress' Commerce Clause authority. 66 Because government reports indicate that a disturbing percentage of high school students have been threatened with guns or have even had guns fired at them in school, Congress could have rationally concluded that the presence of guns in or near schools interferes with the educational process, resulting in the schools' reduced capacity to prepare students for effective participation in the national economy.
67
Chief Justice Rehnquist determined, however, that Congress had overstepped its regulatory authority. His opinion identifies three subject areas that the Supreme Court has historically permitted Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause, "the channels of interstate commerce," "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce" and "activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce."
68 National control of these categories, presumably, does not obliterate the distinction between national regulatory competence and the general police power of the states. The third of these categories is the only one relevant to Lopez, but Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the Court, within this category, has routinely upheld the regulation only of economic activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 69 Because the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act did not explicitly narrow its purview to guns that, on a case-by-case basis, were shown to have either traveled in commerce or affected commerce, Chief Justice Rehnquist implies that the statute should not enjoy the nearly automatic imprimatur that the Court attaches to statutes regulating economic activities. Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically rejects the Government's proffered justifications for the Gun-Free School Zones Act. He declines to sustain the Act on the ground that guns near schools are threats in general to interstate commerce either because of their collective contribution to crime or because of the risks they pose to an educational process, which, in turn, is critical to the success of interstate commerce. 71 He does not deny that guns threaten interstate commerce in these ways. Rather, he offers the following observations:
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no [statutory] requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce. To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the states.
72
The last quoted sentence echoes his earlier observation: "[I] f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we [would be] hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate." 73 Chief Justice Rehnquist's precise argument is not altogether clear from these passages. A relatively modest interpretation of his position would argue that, based on the actual record presented, the Court found the connection in fact between gun possession near schools and interstate commerce to be too tenuous to sustain a confident conclusion that Congress' judgment in regulating gun possession on interstate commerce grounds had been rational. Even if it is rational to treat guns near schools as posing a significant risk to the educational process, and even if the national economy depends on effective education, it may simply not have been self-evident, at least to the Lopez majority, that the particular damage inflicted by the appearance of guns in schools is of the quality or quantity that bears a likely relationship to the future capacity of present-day students to be productive participants in interstate markets and enterprises. Because this view of Rehnquist's argument would emphasize the degree of care that courts should exercise in ascertaining an empirical basis for Congress' judgments, let us call this the "fact sensitivity interpretation" of Lopez. On the other hand, it may be that what provoked the majority's anxieties about the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not really the empirical speculation embodied in the inferences that would sustain Congress' judgment. After all, the majority does not assert that the inferences adduced by the government are untrue. Rather, it may be that what bothers Chief Justice Rehnquist about the Government's inferences is that equally sound inferences of an almost identical kind would go very far towards sustaining virtually any national regulation of any local activity, including all material aspects of K-12 schooling. In other words, it is not "pil[ing] inference upon inference" per se that is constitutionally problematic, but rather the accumulation of inferences that are qualitatively of a sort that wouldjustify a great deal of other far-reaching regulation as well. I would call this the "dual federalism interpretation" of Lopez, because it would attribute to the case not so much a sensitivity to contextual facts as a categorical intention to evict federal legislators from some exclusive domain of state policy making.
The concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, seems to embrace the less ambitious fact-sensitivity approach to Lopez, and to imply a new Commerce Clause "test" more clearly than does the Rehnquist opinion.
7 4 Justice Kennedy writes that, "unlike the earlier cases" in which the Court has deferred to Congress, "neither the actors [regulated by the Gun-Free School Zones Act] nor their conduct has a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an evident commercial nexus." 75 A logical inference is that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor would have voted to uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act if the conduct or actors regulated were commercial or if the nexus between the conduct or actors and interstate commerce were somehow more "evident." They would seem to require only an extra level of empirical grounding to satisfy the Court's implementation of rationality review regarding the national regulation of non-commercial activities.
In explicating the doctrinal shortcomings of Lopez, it is helpful to consider the case in tandem with Brzonkala, its predictable offspring. It is an offspring that the Supreme Court may yet disown-the Court has granted certiorari in the case under the name United States v. Morrison. 76 But, whether or not the Fourth Circuit's reasoning survives Supreme Court review, it amply illustrates the doctrinal problems Lopez creates, especially if accorded a "dual federalism" interpretation.
As noted earlier, the issue in Brzonkala was the constitutionality of creating a federal damages remedy for victims of gender-based violence. The VAWA established a federal substantive right in " [a] In deliberating on the VAWA, "Congress carefully . .. documented the substantial effect that gender-based violence has on interstate commerce and the national economy."
79 Congress determined that:
[C] rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce . . ., by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products. Putting aside for the moment Congress' other relevant findings in support of the Act, the foregoing facts standing alone would seem to sustain the VAWA readily under pre-Lopez doctrine. In enacting the VAWA, Congress rationally concluded that acts of gender-based violence, viewed cumulatively, place a substantial burden on interstate commerce and that the availability of a civil damages remedy would both reduce the resulting 77. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994 The Fourth Circuit majority, however, rejects not only this reasoning, but also the fact sensitivity orientation to Lopez. In the majority view, Lopez is a dual federalism opinion, which creates a more ambitious and more categorical rule. Namely, Congress may regulate a non-economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce only if the activity is "sufficiently related to interstate commerce to satisfy the substantially affects test" without relying "upon arguments which, if accepted, would eliminate all limits on federal power and leave [a court] 'hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.' "87 According to the majority, the VAWA fails this test because gender-based violence is non-economic activity and because the defense of its regulation relies upon arguments that "pile inference upon inference" to connect gender-based violence to interstate commerce in a manner that, if indulged, could justify federal regulation of virtually all human activity. 88 As it happens, I believe that Lopez was incorrectly decided, even if deemed to stand only for the fact-sensitivity approach that the Brzonkala dissenters advocate. On certiorari, the Supreme Court may overturn Brzonkala on factual grounds, following the Kennedy-O'Connor approach. A majority could persuasively determine that Congress' deliberative record draws a sufficiently compelling connection between the conduct regulated and interstate commerce to verify the rationality of Congress' approach, even under a heightened standard of rationality review. That approach to Lopez is subject to the obvious criticism that what it demands from Congress, and what it is likely to elicit, is too much in the nature of a formality. It has generally been the Court's position that the constitutionality of stat- utes does not depend upon a set of statutory findings or on evidence that Congress' deliberations were especially thorough. 89 Asking judges to make fine distinctions between just how much evidence is necessary to convert plausibility into sufficient rationality for constitutional purposes is also inviting judges, in the guise of neutral decisionmaking, to challenge the wisdom of legislative choices they are not authorized to make. Nonetheless, Lopez and Brzonkala are plainly distinguishable on this ground. And, the fact-sensitivity approach to Lopez at least has the attractive feature of not rendering that case an open-ended invitation to the federal judiciary to second-guess Congress on the justifiability of legislation whose foundations are better assessed by legislators than by judges.
Presumably, the Fourth Circuit believes it has a more accurate reading, if not of Lopez as written, then at least of the doctrine Chief Justice Rehnquist might have advocated if he were not burdened by the necessity of attracting the votes of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. If so, the fate of Brzonkala in the Supreme Court will depend on the willingness of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor to take a more categorical stance regarding Congress' authority to regulate non-economic activity.
Under the Fourth Circuit interpretation of Lopez, lawyers cannot save the VAWA even by verifying the quantitative impact of gender-based violence on the economy. 90 Even if such a connection were demonstrated, it would provide the sort of rationale for the VAWA that would threaten to validate the "essentially limitless nature of congressional power."
9 ' If factual investigation is the key to constitutionality, "the only conceivable limit on congressional power to regulate an activity would be the significance of that activity, because any significant activity or serious problem will have an ultimate, though indirect, effect upon the economy, and therefore, at least presumptively, upon interstate commerce as well." 92 The majority purports to recognize that "Lopez undoubtedly preserves a healthy degree of judicial deference to reasonable legislative judgments of fact." '93 But Brzonkala effectively treats that deference as irrelevant if the pertinent "legislative judgments of fact" would, in fact, sustain any significant breadth of federal regulation with regard to local non-economic activity. The majority's concern is not with ascertaining Congress' reasonableness, but in insulating some part of the world of local health, safety and morals regulation from congressional participation.
89. SeeTurner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) ("Congress is not obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type that an administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial review.").
90. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 843 (rejecting "a purely quantitative view of the substantially affects test" that could "extend federal control to a vast range of problems falling within even the most traditional areas of state concern"). Even if this were a justifiable judicial project, a subject to which I will turn shortly, the interpretation of Lopez advocated by the Brzonkala majority would result in doctrine so arbitrary that it cannot have much of a future. 94 It is a doctrine vulnerable to at least four fundamental challenges.
A. The Jurisdictional "Red Herring"
The arbitrariness of Brzonkala's reading of the Commerce Clause is evident from the Fourth Circuit's express acknowledgment that, even under Lopez, non-commercial acts with a specific interstate nexus are comprehensively subject to national regulation, so long as such regulation is minimally rational.
9 5 The VAWA, for example, authorizes criminal punishment for "any person who travels across a State line ... with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner ...
."96
But why should the addition of this interstate 'Jurisdictional element" make any difference to the justification for Congress' intervention? Notwithstanding the jurisdictional requirement, the criminal provisions of the VAWA still overlap with the states' police powers. It is not likely that any one act of traveling across a state line to commit domestic violence has a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Nor is there necessarily any commercial character to the act of moving interstate itself. Yet, the Brzonkala majority concedes "that the legislative record .. .supports the wisdom and legitimacy of many of the measures Congress enacted in the Violence Against Women Act, such as ... the criminalization of violence against women with an explicit interstate nexus ... ."97 From the standpoint of protecting either federalism or interstate commerce, the majority can give no reason why the same documentation that provides normative support for the "wisdom and legitimacy" of creating a federal felony does not equally support the "wisdom and legitimacy" of creating a federal damages action. Nothing about the jurisdictional element changes the normative underpinnings of the law. 95. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 851 (noting that Congress had presented sufficient evidence that violence against women affects interstate commerce to justify portions of the VAWA).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994). 97. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 851. 98. Indeed, from the standpoint of federalism, the creation of a federal criminal offense-resulting in a seeming competition between state and federal officials to control criminal conduct-would appear to be more problematic, even with a jurisdictional limitation, than the creation of a private damages remedy. A private damages remedy does not augur the kinds of harm that have been attributed to the "inappropriate federalization" of criminal law. See AMERICAN In this respect, it is noteworthy that, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, Congress had already revised the Gun-Free School Zones Act to proscribe gun possession near schools only if the firearm in question "has moved in or ... otherwise affects interstate commerce." 99 This amendment presumably entails an extra element of proof for federal prosecutors, but it hardly seems to limit the number of potential prosecutions or the consequent presence of the federal government in the policing of local firearms possession. Again, from the standpoint of federalism or congressional regulatory authority, the jurisdictional element adds nothing in principle to the justifiability of Congress' initiative.
B. The Irrelevant Distinction Between Commerce and Non-Commerce
Second, and just as basic, it is impossible to formulate a plausible normative basis for a distinction between commercial and non-commercial activity in assessing Congress' regulatory powers from the perspective of federalism.
1 01° It is conventionally understood that the reason Congress is authorized to regulate local commerce is because local commercial activity can have a substantial relation to interstate commerce, and Congress is appropriately empowered to attend to this substantial relationship when necessary and proper either to promote interstate commerce or to prevent interstate commerce from becoming the vehicle of some social harm. But, whatever reason justifies national regulation of local commerce as it affects interstate commerce, the same reason will pertain just as persuasively to national regulation of local non-commerce. If attending to a substantial relationship between local non-commercial activity and interstate commerce helps to promote interstate commerce, then Congress should be allowed to regulate. If attending to that relationship would help prevent interstate commerce from becoming the vehicle of some social harm, then Congress should be empowered to act on that basis. 100. See Hovenkamp, supra note 54, at 2229-232 (discussing various interpretations of "commerce"). There is a linguistic reading of "commerce among the several states" that would include purely local commerce within that category. See id. On that reading, a local commerce/non-commerce distinction with regard to the Commerce Clause itself could perhaps be justified on the formal ground that this particular clause explicitly authorizes the regulation of local commerce, but not the regulation of local non-commerce. See id. Even so, Congress still enjoys the power to make "all laws necessary and proper" for the execution of its commercial regulatory powers; tinder this authority, removing all impediments to interstate commerce, whether commercial or non-commercial in their origin, would appear to be equally valid. See Lessig, supra note 51, at 129 (discussing expansiveness enabled by "necessary and proper" clause).
101. See Lessig, supra note 51, at 129-30 (discussing textualist and originalist readings of "necessary and proper" clause).
[ Lopez and Brzonkala suggest this is a dangerous move because federal regulation of non-commercial activity would "bid fair," to recall Chief justice Rehnquist's flowery phrase, to convert national regulatory power to a general police power. 1 0 2 But the regulation of local non-commercial activity is no more or less a threat to state police power than the regulation of local commercial activity. The power of states to promote the health, safety and morals of the people has always been understood to embrace the power of states to regulate their own economies.
10 3 When federal commercial regulation preempts, limits or even supplements state commercial regulation, it is interfering every bit as much in local police power as would federal regulation of local non-commercial activity.
The commercial/non-commercial distinction likewise cannot bejustified on the ground that it is a reasonable tool for differentiating Congress' authentically economic motives from congressional motives grounded in concerns of public welfare or morality that are traditionally the focus of state non-economic regulation. Compare, for example, a national antiprostitution statute with a hypothetical federal law purporting to mandate compulsory education in some East Asian language as a prerequisite to high school graduation.' 0 4 The first regulates economic activity and the second not. Yet, the second law is obviously grounded in economic motivations that probably do not animate the first. There is no reason consistent with the Commerce Clause why Congress' commerce-driven compulsion of Asian language education should be more suspect than its morally driven regulation of prostitution, which is clearly what Lopez and Brzonkala suggest. Or to take a more homely example, we should be more suspicious of a hypothetical federal law that would regulate what a parent may give his or her child as a weekly allowance than of the actual statute making it a crime to possess a gun within 1,000 feet of a school. Yet, because of the plainly economic character of a monetary allowance, Lopez and Brzonkala point the opposite way.
In fact, the distinction between commercial and non-commercial activity does not map onto any value commonly associated with federalism. Whether we value the diffusion of political authority, respect for diversity, the capacity of states to innovate in making public policy, or the promotion of government accessibility and accountability, federal preemption of state authority to regulate non-economic activity is no more and no less 
C. Hyper-Formalism and the Slippery Slope
The third problem with Lopez and Brzonkala is their implication that federal regulation of non-economic activity ought to be more suspect to the extent its supporting rationale would also justify a great many other regulations of non-economic activity. It is in this vein that the Brzonkala majority is careful to distinguish its disapproval of the VAWA from a 1997 Fourth Circuit opinion upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994.106 Unlike the VAWA, which is based on the pervasive economic effects of gender-based violence, the Clinic Entrances Act was upheld, the Brzonkala majority says, because blocking abortion clinics is related to a discrete and identifiable interstate economic enterprise, namely, the interstate market in reproductive health services.
10 7 Thejustification for upholding the Clinic Entrances Act is not a justification that would sustain every other regulation of non-economic activity, but only a justification that would sustain other regulations of non-economic activity that affect the interstate market in reproductive health services. It is thus a permissible form ofjustification under the analysis of Lopez and Brzonkala.
This logic is wonderfully perverse. It implies that national legislation is arguably most suspect precisely where the problems it addresses are most pervasive. But the analysis suggests also just how easily the Brzonkala version of the Lopez holding can be evaded. Instead of enacting what might have been called the All Violence Against Women Act, Congress should have enacted the Violence Against Women on College Campuses Act, the Violence Against Women in Public Accommodations Act, the Violence Against Women in Automobile Factories Act, and so on, each to prevent gender-based violence from burdening not commerce as a whole, but rather the interstate markets for education, hotel rooms and automobiles, respectively.
105. It has similarly been argued that the distinction between "commandeering" states and preempting state law also fails to map onto any important value ordinarily associated with federalism. 106. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994); see also Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 587 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that obstruction of abortion clinic entrances "is closely connected with, and has a direct and profound effect on, the interstate commercial market in reproductive health care services").
107. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, at 840 n.9 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) ("It is plain that we did not uphold the statute in Hoffman because the regulated conduct affected the national economy, but rather because it directly affected a specific interstate market and was also 'closely and directly connected with an economic activity."') ( Indeed, a moment's reflection on this approach reveals how a more ingenious Congress might have provided for gun-free school zones. First, Congress should have enacted the Gun-Free Private School Zones Act to protect the interstate market in K-12 educational services (and, of course, to protect private schools as efficacious and robust participants in interstate markets for books and educational supplies). Congress should then have followed this statute with the Gun-Free Public School Zones Act. Having realized that its first statute might give private schools an unfair advantage in recruiting students, Congress would now assure the same level of protection to public schools, not to address the much too general concern of keeping children safe, 10 8 but to prevent interstate commerce in private education from becoming a burden to the effective recruitment of students by public schools. Congress could formalize its economic conclusions in formal statutory findings, and words like "violence," "health" or "public safety" need never appear.
If all this sounds too cute by half, it is nonetheless the kind of hyperformal rationalization that Lopez and Brzonkala would invite. Our courts would do better to recognize that, once Congress has reasonably identified a national problem with pervasive economic effects, requiring Congress to address that problem one economic sector at a time serves no federalism value.
D. Usurpation of the Legislative Role
And this leads to the fourth fatal difficulty of our latest resurrection of "old federalism." Because the commercial/non-commercial distinction is so easily evaded on formal grounds, the Brzonkala reading of Lopez can only be implemented in a serious way by courts willing to go beyond the artificial formality of the distinction to something more substantive. But whatever that "something" may be, the courts will find themselves either second-guessing legislative motivation-a highly dubious form of adjudication when a law is fully defensible without reference to legislative motiveor usurping the legislative role in making policy.' 0 9
For example, should Congress enact my hypothetical commercially driven prohibitions on gun possession, a court might be tempted to see past the formal niceties and reject the legislation on the ground that, regardless of Congress' commercial discourse, the statute "in its effect... aims" to protect children from gun violence, thus "exert[ing] a power as to a purely local matter to which the federal authority does not extend."'
10
The Supreme Court employed this very formulation to invalidate Congress' 1916 statute purporting to limit the use of child labor, a law whose 108. One yearns here to insert the "emoticon" ubiquitously used on the internet to show that one is joking, namely, :-).
SeeJohn Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1222 (1970) (discussing courts' consideration of legislative intent).
110. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
impact on interstate commerce could hardly have been either more obvious or more direct. 11 1 This disgraceful national experience alone ought to caution us against permitting judges to base their assessments of constitutional authority on malleable and often dubious characterizations of the motives or purposes that underlie a statute.
Professor Deborah Merritt, among our most distinguished contemporary commentators on the constitutional law of federalism, has suggested that courts can avoid the artificialities entailed in policing a rigid categorical distinction between commerce and non-commerce. 112 Rather than focus on whether regulated conduct does or does not categorically belong to a discrete set of activities called "commerce," courts should employ what mathematicians call "fuzzy logic," asking instead, "'[H] ow much is this conduct like commerce?' and 'how much like commerce must conduct be before Congress can regulate it?
' ' 1 3 The problem with this approach, and an objection that Professor Merritt anticipates, is that ajudicial determination of "commerce-likeness" may seem little more than a judicial reassessment of the justifiability of a national statute. 1 14 A court would ask itself whether, in light of the competing arguments for national intervention or state exclusivity in a particular area, some contested activity should be deemed to resemble interstate commerce sufficiently to warrant congressional action. Congress, however, when it enacts a statute, has already answered this question, at least implicitly. Critics may distrust Congress' answer because they perceive Congress to be an "interested party" in disputes over the boundary between state and national regulatory authority.
1 1 5 But, so long as a statute is rationally designed either to promote interstate commerce or to prevent interstate commerce from inflicting social harms, any deeper inquiry into the legitimacy of Congress' response would be, in Chief Justice John Marshall's words, "to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground."' 16 This ought to be done only if there is some genuinely compelling institutional need to enlarge the usual judicial role. As I discuss below, no such need exists. 
See id. (" [
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IV. LopEz AND ITS PROGENY AS MISGUIDED ACTIvISM
A. Are Lopez and Brzonkala Activist?
The unsoundness of the doctrinal maneuvers emanating from Lopez, especially as interpreted by Brzonkala, are enough to belie ChiefJudge Wilkinson's claim that the current activist jurisprudence on federalism "holds the promise to be... enduring and constructive .... "117 Even if judicial activism on this subject were warranted, we should hardly applaud activism that takes the form of doctrinal incoherence.
Before assessing the justifiability of any activist project for federalism, however, it may be helpful to consider what observers of the judiciary mean, or should mean, in labeling particular instances ofjudicial decision as examples of "judicial activism." For example, I recently wrote a short essay on the Brzonkala case for an electronic political journal, which elicited one reader's reaction that ChiefJudge Wilkinson was wrong in calling the Brzonkala decision activist because the Fourth Circuit was attempting only to implement faithfully an originalist understanding of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.
118
One might offer in response to this argumentJudge Richard Posner's definition of judicial activism as the use of judicial power to second-guess the policy determinations of the non-judicial branches of government. On this understanding, Lopez, Brzonkala and every other decision that overturns a statute or executive action is activist. That definition, however, seems conspicuously both over-and under-inclusive.
For example, it hardly seems activist for ajudge to overturn the initiative of a non-judicial branch if there already exist relevant legal texts that, conscientiously interpreted, more or less dictate such a result. Some theorists of interpretation seem to deny the existence of such cases, but the judge for whom I clerked, the late Alvin B. Rubin of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, once expressed to me, in terms I think many judges would recognize, a contrary attitude. "Every judge," he said, "with any genuine intellectual capacity at all knows that there are some decisions that just 'won't write.'" If, following conventional norms of judicial decisionmaking, an opinion upholding the disputed initiative of a non-judicial branch "just 'won't write,"' then to label as "activist" the judicial opinion that "will write" seems to obscure more than it clarifies.
On the other hand, if ajudge is self-consciously creative in generating a largely unprecedented constitutional outcome, it hardly seems to be less activist if the outcome favors, rather than overturns, the initiative of a nonjudicial branch. In Paul v. Davis, 120 to take a Rehnquist-authored example, the Court distorted relevant precedent beyond recognition in order to uphold the discretion of city authorities to include individuals in public postings of habitual shoplifters without affording such individuals a prior hearing.
121 The Court's inventiveness fairly screamed its activist mind-set, even though the result in this particular case was to expand, rather than contract non-judicial administrative authority.
In the effort to analyze judicial behavior, it would seem to be the quality of conscious inventiveness, rather than the direction of a case outcome, that sets judicial activism apart from judicial restraint. When my cyberspace reader challenged ChiefJudge Wilkinson's claim of activism, he was trying to argue this point-that cases like Lopez should not be deemed activist because the Court, in my reader's view, is not inventing new constitutional meaning, but returning to old constitutional meaning. But even if there is some sense in which a constitutional decision uses the "interpretive model," to use Professor Thomas Grey's words, or is "originalist," to use a word that others prefer, it may well entail a degree of innovation that deserves the "activism" label.
122
The recent federalism cases illustrate this point beautifully. Professor Larry Lessig has used the word "translation" to describe what he discerns as the Court's effort to restore, through new judicial doctrines, a set of limits on government power that were inherent in social, economic political or technological conditions that prevailed when the Constitution was framed, but that have more or less evaporated under changed circumstances. 123 He speaks of Lopez as "an act of interpretive fidelity," and as Lessig is absolutely clear in describing this project as one of invention, a "constructivist" effort, and so, I presume, he would accept that acts ofjudicial "translation" are activist.
12 5 Yet, like jurists who self-consciously speak in similar terms, Professor Lessig portrays this activism as significantly constrained because it seeks to create a balance of rights or powers that is "equivalent" to "the original balance." 126 I think this formulation greatly underestimates the inventiveness in which modem courts engage when they purport to translate founding commitments into contemporary doctrines. Lessig uses the notion of translation metaphorically, to imply that once the act of judicial construction is completed, the translator has produced something equivalent to the intended meaning of the founding generation.
12 7 Even translators, however, do not speak of their work as producing equivalents. As legal comparativist Vivian Curran puts the matter:
Translations from formal language to formal language, from discourse to discourse, and from connotation or referential sources of concepts from one legal culture to another, all involve categorization. When translating, one discovers that one transmits only a portion of the original. Generally one selects among various possible subsets of the original, making value judgments as to which aspects of the original sign should be preserved through triage. The text in translation will trigger associations based on those selections, but they will be associations often not present in the original text, triggered by the signifiers used in the translation, such that a transmutation occurs from the original, making the translation a new and distinct product.
28
Professor Curran also points out, "divergences of meaning" between the original language and its translated version are most likely to occur when the language being translated does not correspond to "objects amenable to visible or tactile perception."
129 Legal categories like "federalism" are especially amenable to divergences of meaning.
The idea that the Court in Lopez is re-creating the Framers' intended balance of state and federal power under changed circumstances isolates, as the one changed circumstance worthy of legal response, the unprecedented interconnectedness of virtually all social and economic activity with the consequence that the national power to regulate commerce among Over the past half century, the rates of growth in state expenditure and state employment far outpaced their federal equivalents. It is hardly self-evident that the Framers would have worried anxiously about the selfprotective capacities of states that collectively employ over 4.7 million people and engage in expenditures that, together with those of local governments, amount to roughly 1.35 trillion dollars per year. 130 State licensing authorities now constrain the travel and economic activities of virtually all adults, and, armed with comprehensive data bases of their citizens' whereabouts (and often of their health, income and family status as well), states can reach far more deeply into the lives of individual citizens than any national government would have dreamed of in 1789. At a general level, our founders' fears of tyranny and their belief in the vitality of local community and accessible government remain salient today. But it is fanciful to think that we can somehow recalibrate the formal authorities of national or state regulators and re-create anything meaningfully equivalent to the diffusion of power that the Framers would have recognized in their utterly different world. It is no accident that a hallmark of many activist opinions is bad historical analysis. The contrived attempt to produce a narrative of legal continuity requires the Court either to emphasize historical questions that are irrelevant or to minimize or misinterpret the evidence that matters.
131
The task of operationalizing 1789 federalism in a Twenty-first Century America is not a task of translation, but one of renovation. It is a task of redesigning, whether marginally or comprehensively, the legal doctrines, structures and processes that embody old values so that those values are given their most attractive form under the circumstances of our own age. The project of renovation is linked to a dominant tradition in American constitutional law, which I have elsewhere called "aspirationalism."
13 2 Aspirationalism views "the Constitution as a signal of the kind of government under which we would like to live," and seeks to interpret the "Constitution over time to reach better approximations of that aspiration. 
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that's what our conservative judicial activists are doing, striving for a better approximation based on changed understanding of the constitutionally embedded value of federalism, then I have sympathy with their impulse. The aspirations long linked with federalism-diversity, innovation, political responsiveness, insulation from political oppression-are values worth keeping up to date. The problem, and now I return to Lopez and Brzonkala, is not only that the doctrinal tools of renovation that they have invented in recent Commerce Clause cases are arbitrary, as I have already argued. It is also that this particular aspirational project is ill-suited to the courts. Judicial activism ought be undertaken only when our constitutional system exhibits a compelling institutional need for the judiciary to second-guess elected political authorities and when the constitutional aspiration in question can be implemented through workable, coherent legal doctrine. Neither of these conditions justifies the current judicial activism on behalf of federalism.
B. Conservative Judicial Activism as a Misguided Project
According to Chief Judge Wilkinson, the current era of judicial activism is best assessed against the background of two other periods ofjudicial activism in this century. During the first stage of judicial activism-the Lochner era-courts deployed the so-called "liberty of contract" doctrine to strike down laws enacted for the benefit of women, children and labor. That era, he writes, "is still widely disparaged for its mobilization of personal judicial preference in opposition to state and federal social welfare The second stage, animated by the civil-rights movement, saw "more and more citizens turn[ing] to the courts to vindicate a wide variety of This vision treats as essential to constitutional understanding the broad normative purposes that the Constitution invokes: "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." To use John Marshall's words, those purposes are vindicated by remembering "it is a constitution we are expounding," that in a constitution, "only its great outlines should be marked," and that our constitution was "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." ... Aspirationalism is not tantamount to regarding the Constitution as perfect, or perfectible through ingenious reading.... Aspirationalism does insist, however, that new or evolving understandings of the Constitution may not require formal amendment for their implementation. Cultural change, that is change in social understanding, may make certain reasoned arguments compelling to later generations that earlier generations did not foresee. justly criticized for the institutional strains it caused and for its negative impact on state authority. 136 But "many of its individual decisions were overdue and salutary," including a number of 'Judicial landmarks" whose "position in the pantheon of our jurisprudence is secure." 1 3 7
Chief Judge Wilkinson argues that current judicial activism will be "enduring and constructive" like the second era, rather than an "aggressive intrusion into the activities of coordinate branches" like the first.
138
This is so for three reasons. First, Chief Judge Wilkinson says, current activism does not foreclose all elected officials from dealing with national problems; it requires only that the elected officials be officials of states or localities.
139 Hence, it is preferable to the Lochner period, in which the impact of substantive due process was to remove a variety of pressing social problems from the purview of elected policy makers altogether.
140 Second, he asserts, current efforts do not aim at "an exceedingly narrow" and artificial definition of commerce, just some understanding of the Commerce Clause that gives the courts a significant role in enforcing its limits.
14 1 This effort to find a proper judicially enforceable limitation of the Commerce Clause is imperative because, otherwise, the courts would become "textually selective" in their commitment to judicial review. 142 This, according to Chief Judge Wilkinson, would result in a "complete abdication" of the judiciary's "interpretive duty.' 43 Finally, unlike Lochner-style activism, current activism does not cater to a single constituency, such as big business. 144 The first of these points is incomplete. The others are wrong.
It may be consoling to devotees of representative government that Lopez and Brzonkala disable political initiative only at the federal level, and not at the state and local level. Removing national issues from the national political stage, however, is hardly better than removing them from political resolution altogether if the authorities left to resolve those issues lack the capacity to do so effectively. It is transparent that, on their own, states have not been able to eliminate either threats to school safety from firearms or the plague of gender-based violence.
In this connection, it is worth recalling the origins of the Commerce Clause itself. The Committee on Detail formulated Congress' authority to 135 effectively only with the participation of the national government.
As for his second point, there is no foundation for arguing that the federal judiciary needs to find federalism-based judicially enforceable limits on Congress' Commerce Clause authority in order to avoid abdicating the judicial review power. ChiefJudge Wilkinson's argument on this point is, frankly, so odd in light of our constitutional history that I feel compelled to quote him lest it be imagined that I am simply fabricating his position:
[T] he real challenge to courts is to refrain from being textually selective. Yet .... it is hard to understand how one can argue for giving capacious meanings to some constitutional provisions while reading others out of the document entirely. Here, appellants suggest that we give a reading that would rob all meaning from the phrase "Commerce... among the several States," giving Congress a blanket power simply "To regulate." It seems patently inconsistent to argue for a Due Process Clause that means a great deal and a Commerce Clause that means nothing. How one clause can be robust and the other anemic is a mystery when both clauses, after all, are part of our Constitution.
146
The fact, however-and Chief Judge Wilkinson must surely know this-is that the Court has always been "textually selective" in precisely the way he decries. Among the texts the Court has read in at best "anemic" fashion are the promise to each state of a republican form of government,1 47 and the acknowledgment in the Ninth Amendment of unenumerated rights still "retained by the people."' 48 In similar fashion, the Court has refused to say whether the textual commitment of treaty approval power in the Senate has any implications for congressional authority to participate in treaty termination.
1 49 Within this decade, the Court has held that it has no authority to interpret the procedural implications of the Senate's explicit textual authority to "try" impeachments.
50
These are hardly small matters or trivial bits of constitutional text.
Yet, the American commitment to judicial review has always co-existed with the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that some portions of the constitutional text are exclusively left to the elected branches of the national government for their authoritative interpretation and enforcement. Marbury v. Madison, 151 the very decision that first asserted the federal courts' power of judicial review, states that there are constitutional powers vested in the President for which he is accountable "only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience."' 52 In short, the idea that textual selectivity is inconsistent with judicial review is totally at odds with the tradition of judicial review as it has evolved in the United States.
Moreover, the kind of deference to Congress embodied in the Court's post-New Deal, pre-Lpez case law merely reduces, rather than eliminates the courts' opportunities to enforce limits on Congress' authority. For example, no one argues that the Framers intended Congress to use its commercial regulatory powers to destroy state governments as significantly autonomous governments. I presume, therefore, that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to deprive states of certain authorities or capacities that, in the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, are "indisputably 'attributes of state sovereignty.'"153 For example, however rational it might be to do so, Congress could not eliminate bicameral state legislatures, insist that states locate their capitals in their most convenient ports or abandon property taxation in favor of income taxation. 
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principled limitation on Congress' authority to regulate commerce among the several states is a limitation Congress will hardly ever be tempted to transgress. But it is not much of an argument against a particular interpretation of the Constitution that it will only infrequently afford judges whatever gratification comes from deploying constitutional text to invalidate national statutes. As for Chief Judge Wilkinson's final point-that the new activism improves on the Lochner era because "the outcomes of the current era have not consistently favored a particular constituency"-he is, however inadvertently, misleading.
15 5 First, the problem with Lochnerjurisprudence was not that it favored a particular constituency, but rather that it favored a particular constituency that needed no judicial assistance to assure a fair hearing in the arena of electoral politics. Neither "big business," nor America's propertied elite more generally, needs systematic court protection against federal and state legislative bodies indifferent to their interests. This stands in marked contrast, of course, to the position of AfricanAmericans, among others, whose treatment with indifference or outright hostility by our elected institutions provided a central justification for judicial activism on behalf of civil rights.
6
The current era likewise favors a particular constituency. It is not an economic faction, but a cultural and ideological constituency, comprising those who reflexively oppose activist national government. Such opposition is as reliable a feature of contemporary cultural conservatism as is enthusiasm for school uniforms and movie ratings.
Part of what made Brzonkala a predictable en banc decision was its origin in the Fourth Circuit.' 57 That court's current majority very much represents a conservative movement in constitutional jurisprudence that has been catalyzed in no small part by the Federalist Society since the early state sovereignty inherent in the Tenth Amendment. Similarly, Congress in the exercise of its taxing and spending powers can protect federal savings and loan associations, but if it chooses to do so by the means of converting quasi-public state savings and loan associations into federal associations, the Court has held that it contravenes the reserved powers of the States because the conversion is not a reasonably necessary exercise of power to reach the desired end.
Id. (citations omitted).
155. Law schools and the legal profession are currently strongly dominated by a form of orthodox liberal ideology which advocates a centralized and uniform society. While some members of the academic community have dissented from these views, by and large they are taught simultaneously with (and indeed as if they were) the law. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies is a group of conservatives and libertarians interested in the current state of the legal order. It is founded on the principles that the state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central to our Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be. The Society seeks both to promote an awareness of these principles and to further their application through its activities.
This entails reordering priorities within the legal system to place a premium on individual liberty, traditional values, and the rule of law. It also requires restoring the recognition of the importance of these norms among lawyers, judges, and law professors. In working to achieve these goals, the Society has created a conservative intellectual network that extends to all levels of the legal community. Id. It testifies to the Society's networking success that its current Board of Directors is chaired by former judge Robert H. Bork and Senate Judiciary Committee chair, Orrin Hatch (R-UT). Other members include former Counsel to the President C. Boyden Gray, who served as George Bush's Counsel during the Reagan as well as Bush Administrations, and former Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese, III. Professor Calabresi's current fellow national co-chair is Rep. David McIntosh (R-IN), an adviser to former Vice President Dan Quayle.
Through publications and symposia, as well as its organizational activities, the Federalist Society has made so constructive a contribution to the development of conservative legal thought (and to the intellectual resources available to the legal community more generally), that it remains an enduring mystery why supporters of a more progressive constitutionalism have not emulated its model. muster a comfortable majority of judges around an ideologically purer form of conservative constitutionalism. 16 1 An available method, as exemplified by Brzonkala, is to embrace the most ambitiously conservative version of a Supreme Court precedent that is arguably more moderate, and then to write as if the ambitious rendition is the only faithful interpretation. Not surprisingly, when this happens, the resulting opinion can sound more like a manifesto than a judicial exposition of the law.
The "movement" character ofJudge Luttig's opinion in Brzonkala is as evident in its tone as in its substance. Five aspects of his prose are especially worthy of note because they so strongly signal a sense of political mission that inappropriately exceeds conventional understandings of the judicial role.
The most obvious, albeit the least toxic, of these signals is the extraordinary level to which the Brzonkala opinion raises the phenomenon of protesting too much. When a judge requires sixty-four pages of doublecolumned, single-spaced prose to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of a single non-technical provision of federal law, that alone may well suggest he is reaching too far. 162 In this case, the author's repetitiveness does not strengthen his argument. For example, from the uncontested factual record of widespread violence against women and of the extraordinary economic impacts of such violence, it takes only three implications to connect the VAWA to interstate commerce. The first, which seems self-evident, is that some significant portion of the multi-billion dollar national economic impact inflicted by violence against women implicates interstate commerce. The second is that some non-trivial portion of the adverse economic impact on the interstate economy is traceable to violence "motivated by gender" within the meaning of the VAWA. The third is that the availability of damage actions against perpetrators will either deter (1999) . The notable exception is Myers v. United States, which held that Congress could not condition the President's authority to remove Postmasters General on the consent of the Senate to remove an officer to whose appointment it had been required to give advice and consent. See 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) . Chief Justice Taft might be excused his verbosity on the ground that, as a constitutional scholar and as a former President, he had special interest in definitively resolving the constitutional issue that had also furnished the pretext for the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. such violence or mitigate the degree to which its victims will be injured in their capacity to participate in the interstate economy. None of these inferences is remotely counterintuitive, but it is against this reasoning that Judge Luttig invokes the Rehnquist warning about "pil[ing] inference upon inference."' 63 One might reasonably object, I think, that three inferences is barely a stack, much less a pile. But the rhetorical irony-especially in light of the piling metaphor-is thatJudge Luttig actually employs the Rehnquist phrase, or quotes it verbatim from other judicial opinions, a total of eleven times in the course of his opinion. 1 
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Less humorously, the majority opinion also combines a manifest arrogance with a thinly veiled claim of moral heroism, in which the author implicitly casts his colleagues and himself as defenders of legal purity standing firm against a cabal that includes both the appellants and the dissenters. 165 The arrogance does not go unremarked by the dissent:
As the opening words of its opinion demonstrate, the majority steadfastly refuses to recognize the constraints placed upon the judiciary by the separation of powers. In purporting to act on behalf of "We the People" in striking Subtitle C [of the VAWA]-an act of the people's duly elected legislature-the majority seeks to augment its limited judicial authority with a representative authority that it does not in fact possess.
166
But it is not only the will of "We, the People" that the majority believes to be at stake in its opinion. Consider the following lines from the majority's penultimate paragraph, which defy paraphrase:
We are not unaware that in invalidating section 13981 today, we invalidate a provision of a statute denominated the "Violence Against Women Act." No less for judges than for politicians is the temptation to affirm any statute so decorously titled. We live in a time when the lines between law and politics have been purposefully blurred to serve the ends of the latter. And, when we, as courts, have not participated in this most perniciously machiavellian of enterprises ourselves, we have acquiesced in it by others, allowing opinions of law to be dismissed as but pronouncements of personal agreement or disagreement. The judicial decision making contemplated by the Constitution, however, unlike at least the politics of the moment, emphatically is not a function of labels. If it were, the Supreme Court assuredly would 163 not have struck down the "Gun-Free School Zones Act," the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act," the "Civil Rights Act of 1871," or the "Civil Rights Act of 1875." And if it ever becomes such, we will have ceased to be a society of law, and all the codification of freedom in the world will be to little avail. 16 7 In this hyperbolical and significantly incoherent passage, the Fourth Circuit majority actually casts itself as a heroic force of resistance to the merely superficial appeal of protecting women from violence, and claims a role in saving society from itself. 168 It is additionally distressing that Judge Luttig quite clearly takes this battle personally. He scolds the plaintiff, the Justice Department and the dissenters in personal terms as if their advocacy for a moderate reading of Lopez were an act of lese majestj against the forces of constitutional purity.' 6 9 He seems to imagine that the appellants and the dissenters share a personal connection, as a result of which the dissent's arguments will actually have emotional implications for appellants. He writes that the dissent "lay[s] bare appellants' ... standard of review to an extent that will surely prove disquieting to appellants," and that the dissent "stands in what we suspect will be, for appellants uncomfortable testament to this infinite reach of appellants' argument."'
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It is mysterious why Judge Luttig would advert to the appellants' supposed reactions to the dissent. One yearns to have been able to assure Judge Luttig that nothing about the dissenting opinion would prove either disquieting or uncomfortable to 167 In summary, although appellants expressly contend that Harris and the Civil Rights Cases are distinguishable, have tacitly been overruled or modified, and have been repudiated by subsequent authorities, it is apparent from the character of each of these arguments and the "authorities" upon which they rely that appellants really have no argument other than that we should ignore these decisions because they are "too old" to be controlling. To the point of histrionics, in fact, appellants incant that Harris and the Civil Rights Cases are simply "outdated,""century-old," from the "1870's [sic] and 1880's," "19th century" cases, and of little interest to "modern courts," or those with "modern" views about the proper scope of Congress' powers. Indeed, the government in its principal brief cites Harris and the Civil Rights Cases but once, and that citation is a parenthetical embedded within footnote. As we are confident appellants appreciate, however, especially in light of the Supreme Court's recent explicit reliance upon both Harris and the Civil Rights Cases in City of Boerne, we are not at liberty simply to conclude that these cases do not represent the Court's current view of congressional power to regulate exclusively private conduct under Section 5.
Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 857, 859.
the appellants other than its failure to garner six, rather than four votes from an eleven-judge bench. Moreover, it is troubling to consider the condescending, even insulting tone that Judge Luttig directs against both appellants and dissenters. He describes appellants' "invocations of 'rational basis review' as "incessant," and their Fourteenth Amendment argument as "maundering" and marked by "incant[ation]" "to the point of histrionics.' 71 He chastises them for merely "tepid" acknowledgment of the distinction between economic and non-economic activity and characterizes their paraphrase of Congress' reasoning as manifesting "an understandable-though barely excusable-reluctance to quote it in its entirety." 172 He also suggests that their perspective on Lopez verges on unethical misrepresentation. 173 For Judge Luttig, the interpretive disagreement over the reach of the Commerce Clause-or, more accurately, the reach of Lopez-is invested with a depth of moral significance more readily associated with religious crusades than with legal interpretation.
Finally, one must be excused also for concluding that one reason Judge Luttig imagines the appellants and the dissenters to be arrayed against him on a personal level is that Brzonkala is a case about the VAWA and both the plaintiff, Christy Brzonkala, and the author of the dissenting opinion, Diana Gribbon Motz, are women. 174 Judge Luttig feels compelled to recite a lengthy passage from Judge Motz's opinion because it is "so startling in its quaint innocence."' 175 His scolding for "histrionics" stereotypically attributes to the appellants an excessive emotionalism, which he implicitly contrasts with the court's allegiance to duty and reason. Judge Luttig also infers from the appellants' strategy of offering alternative theories in support of their position that they are knowingly advancing legally insupportable arguments. See id. at 873 (stating appellants are motivated to argue in alternative because they are "[e]vidently aware of the speciousness of these distinctions and, ultimately, of the fundamental premise on which they rest"). But the weakness of ChiefJudge Wilkinson's analysis lies in more than the defects of the arguments he makes. It lies also in the critical point he ignores, namely, that the era of civil rights-oriented judicial activism, unlike the Lochner era, had a weighty institutional justification. As I have already noted, the Court was responding to the systemic difficulties posed for historically disadvantaged groups in eliciting genuine responsiveness from the non-judicial branches of state and federal government. By now embarking on a program of judicial activism for the states, the courts are not filling any comparably compelling institutional need.
In writing the opinion overturning National League of Cities, 180 the late Justice Blackmun invoked the argument made famously by Herbert Wechsler, and more recently by Dean Jesse Choper, that the primary constitutional protections for federalism lay in the structure and composition of the national government itself.' 8 ' Without rehearsing the details of this 178. Id. at 898 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). Judge Luttig writes with objectionable and arguably gendered belligerence thatJudge Motz and those who join her are "candid about their prostrate deference to congressional pronouncements." Id. at 847. Wondering whether I might be springing too quickly to an inference that this phrase is both singularly insulting to a fellow judge, and, in context, inappropriately sexualized, I checked on March 10, 2000 to see whether the phrase "prostrate deference" had ever before appeared in any judicial opinion. A search of the "ALLCASES" and "ALLCASES-Old" WESTLAW databases produced no other state or federal judicial opinion in which the phrase appears.
179. A common and disquieting feature of politically motivated diatribes is smearing one's opponents by attributing to them one's own behavior. Judge Luttig accuses the appellants of repetition to the point of "incantation," yet he quotes "pil[ing] inference upon inference" eleven times. Id. at 880. For a further discussion of Judge Luttig's use of "pil[ing] inference upon inference," see supra note 164 and accompanying text. He anticipates that the dissent will disquiet the appellants, without apparently wondering how a rape victim might react to being told by the majority that she is trying to "emasculate" the court. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 858. He accuses appellants of trying to disguise the true import of Lopez without ever providing his own account of what led Justice Kennedy to a separate concurrence elaborating what he and Justice O'Connor have determined is the "limited holding" of Lopez. See id. at 919 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). It is hard to imagine that any "histrionics" in the appellants' briefs could outdo Judge Luttig's own over-the-top penultimate paragraph. Id. at 880. And, anticipating that critics might infer a political agenda behind the Fourth Circuit's view of the law, he offers in that final paragraph a preemptive characterization of any such criticism as "this most perniciously machiavellian of enterprises." Id. at 889. In every respect, this opinion stands in disconcerting opposition to any recognizable ideal of judicial temperament. At the risk of closing on the briefest mention of a very big and speculative idea, I also wonder whether the greatest risk to localism at the turn of the Millennium is not the accumulation of national governmental power, but rather the burgeoning of private economic power that is largely unaccountable to any polity whatever. As Parisians bristle against what has cleverly been called "McDomination," it seems clear that the choices among social values and living conditions made available by the states are threatened by economic and technological trends that, if they are worth resisting, cannot be resisted effectively without a sympathetic national legislative authority.
2 00 If we are to "renovate" or even "translate" our founding commitments to diversity into something equally compelling in the post-industrial age, we will have to rely on political actors more formidable than our judges and acts of creativity more meaningful than the imposition of artificial doctrinal constraints on Congress' regulatory powers. 
